Epistemological Disjunctivism by Duncan Pritchard

In Epistemological Disjunctivism, Duncan Pritchard aims to present a McDowell-inspired version of epistemological disjunctivism and to defend it against three main criticisms. The central claim of Pritchards view, which he restricts to perceptual knowledge, is that such knowledge is “paradigmatically constituted by a true belief whose epistemic support is both factive […] and reflectively accessible to the agent” (2-3). Pritchard does not offer positive arguments for this view but since, as he claims, it has the potential to be the “holy grail” of epistemology, this should prove to be enough motivation for epistemologists to take the view seriously. So, although the goals of Epistemological Disjunctivism (ED) might seem modest, the project is worth undertaking given that many, if not most, epistemologists think that the view is clearly false. Importantly, Pritchard skillfully succeeds, in a rather short book, in placing epistemological disjunctivism (ED) as a position worth considering.