Davidsons signature ideas on the holism and autonomy of propositional thought have led some exegetes to hold that he advances a kind of transcendentalism that is discordant with a satisfactory naturalism. On the other hand, Davidsons work has strong connections with naturalism, as some Quinean strands of his thinking make apparent. Two strands can thus be identified in Davidsons thought. One emphasizes features of thought that set it apart from the rest of nature. The otherseeks to locate thought within nature. Taken to extremes these different strands in Davidsons thinking come into tension. After summarizing both strands, we diagnose the apparent tension between them and propose a way to overcome it by making central appeal to the Radical Enactivist claim that minds can be intentionally directed to the world without contentfully representing it. By expanding our thinking about the character of the mental along radically enactivist lines it becomes possible to defend some of Davidsons most important insights about minds while also promoting a satisfactory and demystifying naturalism.
Información de Publicación
Glenda Lucila Satne
Institución: Universidad Alberto HurtadoFacultad: Filosofía y HumanidadesUnidad: Filosofía
Institución: University of WollongongFacultad: LHAUnidad: Philosophy