Contenido conceptual y elementos visuales desatendidos

McDowell (1994) proposed a philosophical theory about perceptual content —call it "conceptualism"— that states that in every case the content of a visual experience necessarily involves concepts that fully specify every single feature consciously and simultaneously available during the experience. In this paper I will question conceptualism, arguing that some visual experiences carry information about so many objects, properties and relations at the same time that it is unlikely for subjects to possess and implement concepts for every feature represented simultaneously by the experience at that time. If this is the case, then McDowell's conceptualism is insufficiently grounded.

Información de Publicación

Autores:

Francisco Pereira

Institución: Universidad Alberto Hurtado
Facultad: Filosofía y Humanidades
Unidad: Filosofía

Revista:

Ideas y Valores

Año:

2009

Mes:

Agosto

Lugar:

Bogotá, Colombia

Volumen:

LXVIII

Número:

140

Páginas:

119-141

Url de Publicación:

http://www.scielo.unal.edu.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0120-00622009000200006&lng=es&nrm=.