In her “Can Frege Pose Freges Puzzle?”, Stavroula Glezakos claims that Frege cannot pose his puzzle without appealing to something like the theoretical notion of Sinn and so the so-called puzzle does not affect non-Fregeans and Fregeans should not be puzzled by it since it is their framework that both generates and explains it. But contrary to what Glezakos thinks, I argue in this paper that both Fregeans and non-Fregeans alike face a puzzle about true identity statements concerning proper names that can and should be posed given some idiosyncrasies of natural languages. Indeed, it seems that a successful theory of natural language proper names must appeal to Sinn-like entities to capture cognitive differences in true identity statements.
Información de Publicación
Leandro De Brasi
Institución: Universidad Alberto HurtadoFacultad: Filosofía y HumanidadesUnidad: Filosofía
Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica