Closure Intuitions and Restriction

In this article I consider some alleged intuitive costs concerning the denial of the full generality of the Principle of Closure for knowledge. Usually philosophers dismiss such denial as highly counter-intuitive but I argue that,at least with regard to the alleged costs here considered,this is wrong: given our folk-intuitions,there are no such costs. So a fallibilist who seeks to halt the closure-based sceptical argument can restrict the principle with no such intuitive costs.

Información de Publicación

Autores:

Leandro De Brasi

Institución: Universidad Alberto Hurtado
Facultad: Filosofía y Humanidades
Unidad: Filosofía

Revista:

Praxis Filosófica

Año:

2014

Mes:

Junio

Lugar:

Cali,Colombia

Número:

38

Páginas:

225-248

Url de Publicación:

http://praxis.univalle.edu.co/numeros/n38/N38-11.pdf.